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Agricultural commodity futures in India are settled by physical delivery, and the seller can choose 
the location of delivery from a list described in the contract specifications. Cash markets at these 
locations represent the deliverable basket for the futures contract and are the underlying assets 
for the delivery options granted to the seller by virtue of contract design.  These cash markets are 
generally heterogeneous. This paper studies the impact of heterogeneity of the underlying cash 
markets in different locations on the hedging effectiveness of the associated futures contract. The 
hedging effectiveness of cottonseed oilcake and soybean futures is regressed against several 
variables that represent heterogeneity of the underlying cash markets using ridge regression. We 
find that, in general, the greater the heterogeneity, the poorer the hedging effectiveness of the 
contract. This paper is unique in that it provides a framework for guidance for contract designers 
at exchanges and regulators who will find this research useful in optimizing delivery specifications 
for agricultural futures contracts.  This is especially important given the declining volumes in Indian 
agricultural commodity futures. 
 





Hedging effectiveness is a key determinant of the success of futures contracts, as outlined by 
Tajishian (1995), Chance and Hemler (1993) and Yaganti and Kamiah (2012). Several studies have 
demonstrated that the hedging effectiveness of agricultural commodity futures contracts in India is 
in general poor. Yaganti and Kamiah (2012), for instance, suggest that only 40% of commodity 
derivatives are useful from a hedging effectiveness perspective. Aggarwal, Jain and Thomas (2014) 
find that the hedging effectiveness of agricultural commodities is low but variable. The problem is 
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committee 1 in the year 2017 to look into the issues causing the poor integration of cash 2 and 
derivative markets for commodities.  
As Gulati, Chatterjee and Hussain (2017) have shown, the volumes of agricultural commodities futures 
in India has been on a decline since 2012, quite in contrast to volumes in other countries with 
agricultural commodity futures markets such as China and the US. The importance of hedging 
effectiveness for the success of futures contracts suggests that one could look for clues for this poor 
performance in diminished hedging effectiveness of such contracts. The data do appear to show 
that hedging effectiveness of agricultural futures has generally been on the decline over the period 
studied by Gulati et al., (2017). There has been a concomitant increase in the number of delivery 
locations for many contracts such as cottonseed oilcake (increased from 2 to eventually 6) and 
soybean (from 6 to eventually 9). Figures 1 and 2 show this trend for cottonseed oilcake (cocud) and 
soybean.  
In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the moving average of hedging effectiveness over twelve expiries has been 
plotted along the left y-axis, with the number of deliverable locations for each expiry on the right y-
axis with contract expiration on the x-axis (in YYYY-MM format). The moving averages convey the 
trend better as the hedging effectiveness data are noisy. The declining trend of hedging 
effectiveness and the concomitant increase in the number of locations over the same time period is 
evident, and the changes in direction also appear to be related. This suggests that perhaps the 
multiplicity of delivery locations along with some associated factors have a role to play in the 
declining hedging effectiveness of these contracts.  
Figure 1: Evolution of hedging efficiency and number of delivery locations by contract - 
cottonseed oilcake 
 
                                                     
1 This committee was set up as a part of the Government of India’s thrust on doubling farmer income by 2022. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of hedging effectiveness and number of delivery locations by contract- 
soybean 
 
Agricultural commodity futures contracts in India are generally settled by delivery. The seller with an 
open position at expiration can choose to deliver at any of the delivery locations that are specified 
in the contract specifications. In other words, the very design of the contract furnishes the seller with 
an embedded3 option that allows him/her to decide where to make delivery. Cash markets for the 
underlying commodity exist at the different delivery locations permitted under the contract. The most 
important of these is generally chosen to be the reference asset or the par asset for the contract and 
hedging effectiveness of the futures contract is measured with respect to this cash market.  
These deliverable cash markets, while being markets for the same underlying commodity, reflect 
local realities over and above the general conditions that determine the price of the commodity. 
For instance, it may be possible that for a commodity future with three deliverable locations A, B and 
C with A being the par asset location, the underlying commodity traded in the cash market at C has 
a higher moisture content as compared to that at location A due to agro-climatic factors, and hence 
may be of a slightly different grade. The commodity traded in the cash market in location B may be 
affected by local demand and supply factors that may lead to a different volatility and price change 
over a period of time as compared to the commodity traded in the cash market at A. Different 
regulations and taxes may apply to participants and markets at the different locations, leading to 
different conditions of demand and supply.  
Such factors make the underlying cash markets heterogenous. It is generally assumed that the futures 
contract has a specific, narrowly defined commodity as the underlying reference asset in order to 
facilitate proper pricing and hedging. With many deliverable locations, the uncertainty with respect 
to what the underlying commodity is increases, and this brings about a change in standard no 
arbitrage pricing models for the future, which impacts its hedging effectiveness. The economic 
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mechanism via which this happens are the embedded delivery options that the seller has, one of 
which is the location option described above. The inclusion of delivery options tends to reduce the 
value of futures contracts (Boyle, (1989)), which then reduces hedging effectiveness. Tajishian & 
McConnell (1989) have shown that excessively high delivery option values are accompanied by 
impaired hedging effectiveness for a financial futures contract. This impaired hedging effectiveness 
led to the demise of the contract. It stands to reason from the above arguments that the greater the 
optionality, the greater the impact on hedging effectiveness. Many studies have highlighted the 
importance of the number of deliverable assets and their inter-se correlations on option values.  Boyle 
(1989) has used order statistics to theoretically value the location option when there are a varying 
number of equi-correlated assets with identical starting prices and volatilities and finds that the 
greater the number of assets and the poorer the correlations, the higher the value of the options, 
and hence the greater the expected impact on hedging effectiveness.  In a more general case, the 
relative values of the deliverable assets, their inter-se correlations and volatilities will tend to affect 
option values as shown by Boyle and Tse (1990), with its concomitant impact on hedging 
effectiveness.  
It should be noted that the notion of heterogeneity as described above is strongly related to these 
ideas - the greater the number of deliverable assets, the greater the expected heterogeneity and 
the poorer the expected correlations between the deliverable assets, and the greater the value of 
embedded options.  While the option valuation formulation suggests a mechanism of evaluating the 
extent of impact to hedging effectiveness, it does not provide any direct guidance as to what 
specific heterogeneity factors affect hedging effectiveness via the mechanism. These specific 
heterogeneity factors are those which contract designers and regulators have control over, and 
hence the knowledge of such dependence can be used to inform and optimize contract design. 
Optimizing the delivery specifications can help, therefore, in reversing the declining volume trends 
for agricultural commodity futures in India. Motivated by these practical considerations, we study the 
impact of various heterogeneity factors on hedging effectiveness. While contract design is not an 
exact science, such an understanding may perhaps provide guidance. We use some variables that 
are logical candidates to represent heterogeneity of the underlying cash markets. We assess the 
variation of the hedging effectiveness of the futures contract with that of these variables.  
There is not much in the literature by way of prior studies in the area. It is generally well understood 
(see Boyle (1989) and Pirrong, Kormendi and Meguire (1994)) that underlying delivery assets for a 
futures contracts need to be highly correlated, which would imply some requirement of 
homogeneity. Tajishian (1995) discusses the cash markets characteristics required for optimal 
contract design, focusing on the need for high hedging effectiveness and the form of physical 
delivery design. (Gulati, Chatterjee, & Hussain, 2017) suggest some characteristics of contracts that 
may be successful in the Indian context based on macro commodity characteristics. The lack of 
literature in this area is probably a consequence of the fact that extended time series of prices in 
multiple cash markets pertaining to an underlying commodity are not easily available. The National 
Commodities and Derivatives Exchange (NCDEX), which has the largest market share (over 80%) of 
agricultural commodities derivatives volume in India,  has a robust process for collecting and 
disseminating cash prices (see NCDEX (2018)) in several locations for the same commodity. This offers 
a unique opportunity to study, among other things, the impact of heterogeneity of the underlying 
cash markets on hedging effectiveness.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows - Section 2 discusses the approach considerations 
for and the choice of variables that represent heterogeneity of the underlying cash markets. Section 
3 discusses the methodology, data and its availability, Section 4 the results and Section 5 concludes 
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2. Variables representing Heterogeneity  
2.1 Hedging Effectiveness  
We define hedging effectiveness in accordance the work of Ederington (1979). Hedging 
effectiveness is defined as the 𝑅𝑅2 of the regression of returns of futures (𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹) and the returns of the 
cash market in the par asset location (𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴) . In other words, it represents the coefficient of 
determination of the regression model  
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 = 𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽 (1) 
The par asset defines the underlying reference asset for the commodity future and is, in general, the 
most important of the underlying deliverable assets. Delivery of any asset different from the par asset 
invites adjustments to the settlement price called premiums and discounts that are set with reference 
to this par asset. The benefits of addition of delivery locations should be weighed against the 
concomitant degradation of hedging effectiveness with respect to the par asset location. While 
futures contracts could be designed to optimize hedging effectiveness across some combination of 
delivery locations, presumably, the par asset location is chosen as such because it is the most 
important location when viewed in terms of number of participants, trading volumes, warehousing 
capacity and so on. Hence, at a minimum, hedging effectiveness at such a location should be high, 
to ensure success of a contract. We use hedging effectiveness as our dependent variable.  
2.2 Heterogeneity  
Studying the impact of heterogeneity of underlying cash markets requires defining alternative 
variables that represent heterogeneity of the underlying commodity market. In this regard it is 
important to clarify that it is the heterogeneity of the deliverable cash markets for underlying 
commodity that is being considered, i.e. assessing how different they may be within themselves. 
While there is no single parameter or variable that measures heterogeneity, it is instructive to look for 
available data that pertain to the differentiation between the various underlying cash markets as 
measures of heterogeneity. We consider the following candidates:  
2.2.1 Number of delivery locations 
The greater the number of delivery locations, the greater the possibility of heterogeneity of delivery 
location cash markets as discussed in Section 1.  
2.2.2 Number of states in which the delivery locations are geographically located  
In India agriculture is a state subject, with each state responsible for setting the regulations pertaining 
to the trading of agricultural commodities. These regulations could have different implications for the 
price behaviour of the local cash market. For instance, some governments have in the past restricted 
holding stocks beyond a maximum quantity. The consequent rush to liquidate inventories to ensure 
compliance has caused local cash markets to decouple from the general price trend of the 
commodity.  The greater the number of states in which deliverable locations are situated, the greater 
the expected heterogeneity of the cash markets.  
2.2.3 The maximum distance between the delivery locations  
Commodities are expensive to transport and hence such costs act as friction in the transmission of a 
price change in one cash market to others. However, absent other transaction costs, once the price 
differential between two delivery locations is greater than transportation cost, it should be profitable 
to arbitrage by shipping the commodity from the lower priced location to the higher priced location. 
The greater the transportation cost, the greater the possible non-arbitrageable divergence in the 
prices at the cash locations. The greater the distance between locations, the greater the anticipated 
difference in behaviour of the cash markets. The maximum distance between two delivery locations 
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2.2.4 Maximum volatility difference  
It appears reasonable to expect that the greater the difference in volatility, the greater the 
heterogeneity of the underlying commodity.   
2.2.5 Maximum price difference  
If cash prices in the underlying markets diverge significantly, the heterogeneity of the underlying 
commodity is likely to be high. Exchanges use premiums and discounts to account for price 
differences, so the prices used in computing these differences are actual cash prices adjusted by 
the premium/discount. Where a delivery location is accorded a discount, cash prices are adjusted 
upwards by the discount and where a delivery location is accorded a premium, the cash prices are 
adjusted downward by the amount of the discount. The maximum difference in the adjusted 
underlying cash market prices is used as a representation of heterogeneity. See Pirrong et al., (1994) 
for details on the use of premiums and discounts by exchanges and the adjustment of cash market 
prices. In general, a seller who delivers the cheapest to deliver instead of the par asset would be 
expected to realize a gain of   
𝑆𝑆1,𝑇𝑇 − min�𝑆𝑆1,𝑇𝑇, 𝑆𝑆2,𝑇𝑇 + 𝑑𝑑2, 𝑆𝑆3,𝑇𝑇 + 𝑑𝑑3, … , 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛,𝑇𝑇 + 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛� (2) 
where 𝑆𝑆1,𝑇𝑇 , 𝑆𝑆2,𝑇𝑇, … , 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛,𝑇𝑇    are the cash market prices in the 𝑛𝑛 deliverable locations, at the time of 
expiration 𝑇𝑇  and 𝑑𝑑2,𝑑𝑑3, … ,𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 are the discounts applicable for all non-par delivery locations. The 
subscript 1 represents the cash market at the par asset location and hence has no corresponding 
discount term. This leads to the idea that it is price differences between adjusted prices that are 
pertinent for this analysis. We use prices adjusted by the discount/premium in order to compute this 
variable. 
2.2.6 Proportion of delivery that takes place at the par asset delivery location  
It is to be expected that if delivery decreases in the primary delivery location pertaining to the 
commodity, the heterogeneity of the commodity is likely to greater, as other delivery locations attain 
greater prominence at the expense of the primary delivery location. If this happens, clearly there are 
reasons for more than one underlying cash asset to become attractive to participants from a delivery 
perspective, indicating increased heterogeneity.  
Our initial hypothesis is that for each commodity, the hedging effectiveness is dependent on each 
of these six heterogeneity variables with an inverse dependence on the first five and a positive 
dependence on the last. 
 
 
3. Methodology and Data Sources 
We recognize that contract design is based on judgment that considers several different variables. 
Specifically, the choice of delivery locations pertaining to a contract settled by delivery will depend 
on several variables, some of which have been identified above. There may be several others for 
which data is unavailable.  
3.1 Estimation Technique 
Our goal in this paper is to provide some guidance for contract designers to consider the 
heterogeneity of the underlying commodity cash market via the variables listed above. In assessing 
the impact of each of the above variables, it is important to recognize that these variables suffer 
from multicollinearity. To account for this, we use ridge regressions, a technique that is often used in 
such situations. The advantage over using this over other techniques such as principal component 
analysis in this situation is that the original observable variables are not transformed into others that 
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consideration.  Ridge regression requires the selection of an optimum ridge4 parameter, for which 
several approaches exist. We use the methodology of Cule and De Iorio (2012), which has the 
advantage that the ridge parameter is chosen automatically by controlling the variance of the 
model predictions. Our initial hypothesis suggests that the model for each commodity is: 
ℎ = �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=0
+ 𝛼𝛼 (3) 
where ℎ is the hedging effectiveness of a futures contract,  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  represent the various heterogeneity 
variables, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖  represent the corresponding regression coefficients and 𝛼𝛼  the intercept. We test 
whether the coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 are statistically different from zero to assess whether the variable has an 
impact on hedging effectiveness.  
3.2 Data sources  
Publicly available data on the NCDEX website include the following:  
• Cash Prices in the par asset location and some additional delivery locations  
• Futures prices 
• Premium and discount values for the locations where delivery is allowed  
• Delivery values at each location per contract on expiration  
 
We choose contracts that are highly liquid and figure in the top ten commodities traded on the 
NCDEX between the years 2010 and 2017, for which cash price data is available for the par asset 
location as well as at least one other delivery location. The years are chosen to reflect a combination 
of recency along with adequateness of data for the study. Additionally, we focus on commodities 
that show adequate variation in the variables listed in Section 1. Only soybean and cocud have 
adequate variability in the number of locations, with different contracts being deliverable at 6, 8 and 
9 locations and 2, 4 and 6 locations, respectively. For other commodities, the number of delivery 
locations change only by one, and hence it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the data. For 
cocud and soybean the other variables also vary in reasonable ranges and hence these two 
commodities are chosen for study. Since for the two chosen commodities the number of states does 
not change at all, we drop this variable on account of lack of data, even though we believe that 
such a variable should strongly reflect heterogeneity of the underlying commodity market.  
The variables are calculated from the publicly available raw data as described above as follows:  
1. Number of delivery locations (𝑉𝑉1): these are directly observed from contract specification for 
each expiry.  
2. Maximum Distance between locations (𝑉𝑉2): The delivery locations were geocoded, and a 
distance formula applied to calculate the pairwise distance between delivery locations. The 
maximum of these was taken as the variable value.  
3. Maximum volatility difference (𝑉𝑉3): cash prices for the delivery locations (where cash prices 
are available) were obtained for the two calendar months prior to the commencement of 
the expiry month. Given the bidirectional causality that is seen between futures and cash 
price changes, we consider, for a given futures contract, cash prices during the time that the 
futures contract is most liquid. This period comprises the two calendar months prior to the 
expiry month of the future, on account of the fact that as a contract enters the expiration 
month, the exchange imposes stringent position limits and margins, which lead to lower 
liquidity. Daily returns were calculated from these cash price series, and volatility of these 
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series were computed. Pairwise differences between these volatilities were calculated, and 
the maximum difference was chosen as the value of the variable for a particular contract.  
4. Maximum price difference (𝑉𝑉4): As discussed in Section 2, prices are first adjusted for the 
exchange specified premium/discount. The pairwise adjusted price differences on each day 
in the two calendar months preceding the contract expiry month are calculated, and the 
maximum of these is chosen as the daily maximum difference. The maximum of all the 
calculated daily maximum differences is the value if this variable for a given contract. 
5. Par asset delivery proportion (𝑉𝑉5) : From contract level delivery data, the quantity of 
commodity delivered in the par asset location as a proportion of total delivered quantity 
across all delivery locations is taken as the value of this variable. Where the total delivery 
value is zero, the proportion is also taken to be zero.  
For variables 𝑉𝑉3  and 𝑉𝑉4, data are incomplete in that time-series data for only a subset of all the 
delivery locations is available. We compute these variables on the basis of available data. Hedging 
effectiveness (ℎ) is calculated, as explained in Section 2. Par asset cash market returns and futures 
returns are calculated for the two months in which the futures are expected to be the most liquid as 
explained for the variable “Maximum Volatility Difference” above. Based on our hypothesis that 
increased heterogeneity is a cause of degraded hedging effectiveness, it is our expectation the 
regression coefficients for 𝑉𝑉1,𝑉𝑉2,𝑉𝑉3 and 𝑉𝑉4 are negative and the coefficient for 𝑉𝑉5 is positive. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The results for cocud and soybean are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.  
Table 1: The impact of heterogeneity variables on the hedging effectiveness of cottonseed 
oilcake (cocud) futures. Correlation coefficient = 0.679, ridge parameter = 0.1133 
Variable 𝜷𝜷 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 𝜷𝜷 Standard Error p value 
Number of locations (𝑉𝑉1) -0.0334 -0.3901 0.1469 0.0079** 
Max distance between locations (𝑉𝑉2) -0.0006 0.25118 0.1499 0.0939+ 
Max volatility difference (𝑉𝑉3) -0.0752 -0.0323 0.1334 0.8088 
Max price difference (𝑉𝑉4) -1.5937 -0.5447 0.1326 3.97e-05*** 
Par asset delivery proportion (𝑉𝑉5) 0.05368 0.1574 0.1253 0.2088 
Significance codes:  '***’ = 0.001;  '**' =  0.01; '*' =   0.05;  '+'  = 0.1 
Scaled 𝛽𝛽 refers to the regression coefficient when the variable is scaled such that it lies between 0 and 1. This procedure is 
necessary for ridge regression. 
 
Table 2: The impact of heterogeneity variables on the hedging effectiveness of soybean 
futures. Correlation coefficient = 0.637, ridge parameter = 0.1534 
Variable 𝜷𝜷 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 𝜷𝜷 Standard Error p value 
Number of locations (𝑉𝑉1) -0.0050 -0.0567 0.1411 0.6878 
Max distance between locations (𝑉𝑉2) -0.0005 -0.4849 0.1382 0.0005 *** 
Max volatility difference (𝑉𝑉3) -0.0987 -0.0373 0.1262 0.7674 
Max price difference (𝑉𝑉4) -1.1303 -0.5899 0.1213 1.14e-06 *** 
Par asset delivery proportion (𝑉𝑉5) 0.0934 0.2004 0.1209 0.0975+ 
Significance codes:  '***’ = 0.001;  '**' =  0.01; '*' =   0.05;  '+'  = 0.1 
Scaled 𝛽𝛽 refers to the regression coefficient when the variable is scaled such that it lies between 0 and 1. This procedure is 
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4.1.1 Number of locations  
It is seen that the greater the number of locations, the poorer the hedging effectiveness as indicated 
by negative coefficients for both cocud and for soybean. The p value is significant only for cocud at 
the 1 percent level and does not appear to be significant for soybean. The coefficients indicate a 
3.3 percent degradation in hedging effectiveness on addition of a location for cocud.  
4.1.2 Maximum distance between locations  
For both cocud and soybean there appears to be an inverse dependence of hedging effectiveness 
on the maximum distance between locations. The negative coefficients are statistically different from 
zero for soybean at a 0.1 percent significance level and cocud at a 10 percent significance level as 
indicated by the p value. The result appears to suggest than when the maximum distance between 
locations increases by 100 kilometres, the hedging effectiveness appears to fall by 5 percent for 
soybean and 6 percent for cocud.  
4.1.3 Maximum volatility difference  
For both cocud and soybean an increase in the maximum volatility difference has a negative impact 
on hedging effectiveness. However, the coefficients do not appear to be statistically different from 
zero for either commodity. 
4.1.4 Maximum price difference  
For both cocud and soybean, an inverse dependence of hedging effectiveness on max price 
difference is seen. The p values are significant at the 0.1 percent level implying coefficients that are 
statistically different from zero for both commodities. A 1 percent increase in the maximum price 
difference seems to degrade hedging effectiveness of cocud contracts by 1.6 percent while the 
corresponding figure for soybean is 1.1 percent.  
4.1.5 Par asset delivery proportion  
Cocud and soybean contracts both exhibit similar behaviour in that the hedging effectiveness 
appears to be positively related to the par asset delivery proportion. Coefficients are statistically 
different from zero only for soybean at the 10 percent level. For soybean, a 10 percent increase in 
the par asset delivery proportion appears to increase hedging effectiveness by about 0.9 percent.  




5. Conclusions and policy implications  
The results appear to favour the hypothesis that the greater the heterogeneity of the underlying 
commodity cash markets at the multiple permitted delivery locations, the poorer the hedging 
effectiveness of the corresponding futures contract. Regressions yield coefficients that are statistically 
significant for at least one commodity for all variables except for the maximum volatility difference 
variable, and the direction of the dependence is consistent across both commodities, as are relative 
orders of magnitudes of the coefficients and the correlation coefficients.  
These results have important implications for policymakers, regulators, and exchanges. For 
exchanges and regulators, providing contracts that deliver adequate hedging performance is a 
critical aspect in ensuring their acceptance by market participants and their consequent success. 
These results provide a framework for optimizing contract design and suggest that heterogeneity of 
the underlying deliverable commodities needs to be reduced or kept to a minimum to maximize 
hedging performance. The heterogeneity variables used in this study point to some concrete 
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• the number of delivery locations should be kept as  low as practicable, as indicated directly, 
as well as the fact that increasing the number of delivery locations will increase the chances 
that one of these many cash markets may diverge significantly from the par asset, 
• the delivery locations should be as close as practicable to each other, 
• the premiums and discounts should be adjusted frequently to minimize large price differences 
between the delivery locations, and  
• conditions for ensuring that a large proportion of delivery happens at the par asset delivery 
location (such as adequate warehouse capacity, appropriate premium/discounts, and ease 
of transportation) should be put in place.  
In the context of making sense of the declining volumes of agricultural commodity futures in India, 
these results may present some guidance. The addition of many locations as shown in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2,  perhaps in an attempt to expand the appeal of the contract to clientele in diverse 
geographies, may have simply resulted in excess heterogeneity in the underlying deliverable cash 
markets, thereby degrading hedging effectiveness. Such an approach at trying to make the 
contract work for many may have resulted in a situation where it has not worked for anyone 
consistently over the medium term. 
Many of these results have intuitive appeal from the perspective of adjusting the impact of delivery 
optionality. By focusing on specific controllable variables, this study offers a framework for relating 
contract optimization to specific design parameters.  Taken together with ongoing monitoring of 
delivery option values and hedging effectiveness, the framework offers a compelling vision for the 
design and ongoing optimization of agricultural commodity futures contracts. Such an approach 
may ultimately provide the optimal balance between hedging effectiveness and heterogeneity 
arising from delivery options necessary to prevent manipulation and squeezes, with a concomitant 
reversal in the trend of declining volumes in Indian agricultural commodity futures. 
For policymakers such as the Department of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance, Government 
of India, these results point to hitherto unrecognized areas that contribute to the problem their 
committee had attempted to resolve. The report of this committee (see Expert Committee on the 
Integration of Commodity Spot and Derivative Markets (2018)) does not appear to have considered 
the impact of contract design based on physical delivery on hedging effectiveness of futures, which 
creates a direct link between cash and derivative markets. These results suggest that some solutions 
for the problem of poor integration between cash and derivative markets that require only 
coordination with regulators and exchanges in optimizing contract design and are relatively low 
hanging fruit in this endeavour. Finally, coordination with state governments to establish orderly cash 
markets that are as homogenous as possible may also yield positive results in this direction, and the 
report has made a similar recommendation. 
Finally, these results suggest further lines of research. Firstly, the maximum price difference appears to 
be a significant determinant of hedging effectiveness. Clearly, these are dependent on the premium 
and discount set by the exchange. These premiums and discounts are likely to affect the par asset 
delivery proportion, as participants will deliver at a location that is most economically favourable to 
them. Research into setting these premia and discounts optimally will help exchanges optimize 
contract design further. Secondly, this study could be extended by defining hedging effectiveness 
more broadly to be a combination of hedging effectiveness at all the delivery locations to meet the 
goal of maximizing contract appeal. Finally, approaches that focus on integrating the impact these 
variables via valuing embedded delivery options are likely to help complete the continuous 
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